We study a model of double moral hazard in which an information system is used in a decision problem (the principal can choose her own act based on the information) and a control problem (the principal can use the information to motivate the agent). An information system that provides more...

In this paper we examine a simple but suggestive setting in which the income number arises naturally (and directly) from competitive markets. While no explicit assumptions are made about individual firm's objectives, it turns out that equilibrium is consistent with the maximization of a number...

The purpose of this paper is to study capital budgeting in a setting where emphasis is on control over project selection. We construct a model of a multidivisional firm in which there are no constraints on investment and all projects have a positive net present value. Nevertheless, we show that...

This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting is simple. A key aspect of the mechanism is the use of at- will contracts which provide the...

In this paper, we resolve the auditor independence problem that arises in the model studied in Antle (1982, 1984). We argue that the owner-manager-auditor relationship exhibits a "separability" that facilitates the use of a particularly simple mechanism that prevents collusion. The mechanism...

The push for increased transparency in financial reporting and corporate governance serves shareholders only up to a limit. The problem of assessing the value of transparency to shareholders is subtle because both the level and pattern of earnings can convey information. Even when earnings...