I begin by fitting traditional gravity equations to document that regional flows in the Brazilian cement industry exhibit gravity-like structure, with cement trade decaying sharply in distance traveled. I then show that this large distance effect owes to firms' strategic behavior over and above...

This paper argues that large distance and border effects on trade flows in some industries might be a result of the (explicitly or tacitly) collusive division of geographic markets. A simple spatial oligopoly setting demonstrates how goods can travel shorter distances, or trade between regions...

We study competition in markets with significant transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the cases of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers that are closer to plants of competitors. By...

This article studies competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the outcomes of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers who are closer to the competitor's plant....

This article provides an introduction to multimarket competition and the research stream that examines it. Multimarket competition occurs when firms meet their competitors in multiple markets and compete with them by coordinating their strategies across those markets. In this article, we present...

The paper investigates firms’ behavior and outcomes (levels of cost-reducing R&D, output, profit and welfare in equilibrium) in a differentiated duopoly with process innovation. One of the important features in this paper is that spillovers operate in the R&D stage and are tied to the degree...

Consider a setting where threatened rather than actual import competition restrains a domestic oligopoly's prices. I show that not modeling the entry threat may underestimate the true degree of market power, as incumbents' blunted price responses to demand shocks resemble perfectly-competitive...

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

This paper explores the implications of reciprocal trade liberalization for implicit collusion and welfare in the context of a symmetric, homogeneous goods duopoly model with multi-market contact and quantity competition. One of our principal findings is that collusive conduct does not...