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We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338011
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255930
followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even … by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144400
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325212
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256172
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In- cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137200
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325184
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325760