We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …

' financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information … procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify …

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable …. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a procurement mechanism that can be viewed as a … truthtelling in dominant strategies, is ex-post rational, and satisfies the hard budget constraint. Our mechanism obtains an …