We build a model of conflict in which two groups contest a resource and must decide on the optimal allocation of labor … involved in the conflict by transferring financial resources to its origin country. We find that the diaspora influences the … conflict equilibrium, the two groups of residents prefer to negotiate a peaceful settlement if there exists a sharing rule that …

citizens. I find that, under certain conditions, there exists a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in which there are no coups …, there is another Markov perfect equilibrium in which there are no coups, the citizens always revolt, but the military does …

, but also makes staging successful coups easier. In equilibrium, an increase in the likelihood of war makes indirect … involvement less likely; its impact on coups, which are aimed at establishing direct control, is non-monotonic. We show empirical … evidence for this non-monotonic relationship, with coups being least likely for low and high probabilities of war …