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We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302441
Theory predicts that committees of experts may take decisions that look good but are bad and that they show a united … assessments. We investigate this theory in the lab, using treatments with and without reputation concerns and with and without … cheap-talk communication with evaluators. We use the chat among committee members to learn about, e.g., their beliefs about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895939
The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster … of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...
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We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding … it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without …
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We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...
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