This paper investigates the possible equilibria in a game of information transmission with incomplete information. Two individuals are required to reach a decision between two alternatives and a decision is reached only if they can agree on it. Individuals receive private signals and can send...

Strategic decisions are affected by beliefs about the expectations of others and their possible decisions. Thus, strategic decisions are influenced by the social context and by beliefs about other actors’ levels of sophistication. The present study investigated whether strategic...

Recent literature has shown that lying behavior in the laboratory can well be explained by a combination of lying costs and reputation concerns. We extend the literature on lying behavior to strategic interactions. As reciprocal behavior is important in many interactions, we study a theoretical...

Recent experimental research suggests that people behave more cooperatively when the rules governing a strategic interaction (e.g. a public goods game) are modified democratically than when they are modified exogenously. In a related experiment, I show that people are less likely to unilaterally...

Why do people engage in costly cooperation with unknown others that they will never meet again? Answers to this evolutionary puzzle emphasize the role of indirect reciprocity (i.e., cooperation through reputation), whereby cooperation is not reciprocated by the recipient but by other members of...