We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of … their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions …” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of 'centralized college … admissions' (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and 'decentralized college admissions' (DCA) where students only apply to …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of … their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences … for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on … the latter's abilities, which are private information. Students and schools are matched via a decentralized mechanism in …

We conduct a field experiment with 302 workers of the microcredit company in Russia to study the effects of the … four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to … choose the prize prior to the start of the competition and then the winner is selected only among the players who chose the …

2013. Costly mistakes have externalities: they transfer tuition waivers from high- to low-socioeconomic status students …, and increase the number of students attending college. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying mistakes, we exploit a …

. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …