We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of … their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of 'centralized college … admissions' (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and 'decentralized college admissions' (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions …” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one …

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences … for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on … the latter's abilities, which are private information. Students and schools are matched via a decentralized mechanism in …

We conduct a field experiment with 302 workers of the microcredit company in Russia to study the effects of the … four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to … same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead to higher efforts for all players, but mainly …

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether … they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of … their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …