We analyze liability rules in a setting where injurers are potentially insolvent and where negligence standards may deviate from the socially optimal level. We show that proportional liability, which sets the measure of damages equal to the harm multiplied by the probability that it was caused...

We analyze liability rules in a setting where injurers are potentially insolvent and where negligence standards may deviate from the socially optimal level. We show that proportional liability, which sets the measure of damages equal to the harm multiplied by the probability that it was caused...

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive...

When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to...

If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to contract, European and US warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer may use non-conformity as a pretext for getting rid of a...

This paper studies a class of second-best solutions to the Volunteer's Dilemma. We consider a simultaneous-move game involving n players, each of whom can prevent social harm at a cost. Players could be rewarded for helping, be punished for not helping, or be subject to any combination of...

Executive compensation has undergone a radical shift in the United States over the last two decades, from a cash-based system to a stock-based system. This shift, which was intended to improve firm performance, is often said to have two major shortcomings: it drives managers to engage in...

The financial crisis that began in the United States in 2007 and spread into a deep worldwide recession focused attention on agency costs in leveraged firms. Particular attention was given to the incentives of shareholders in such firms to overinvest (known as the "risk-shifting" problem) or...