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In the uniform-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 below the Walrasian price. By...
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An innovation (e.g., new product or idea) spreads like a virus, transmitted by those who have previously adopted it. Agents update their beliefs about innovation quality based on private signals and when they hear about the innovation. We characterize equilibrium adoption dynamics and the...
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In some uniform price auctions, the auctioneer retains flexibility to adjust the total quantity sold after receiving the bids. Would such an auctioneer be better off committing to a fixed quantity and reserve price? Not necessarily. In the simplest possible model, this paper shows that...
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This paper characterizes the social-welfare maximizing equilibrium of a stochastic partnership matching market, in which players paired to play a stochastic game may quit to be costlessly and anonymously re-matched. Patterns of performance and turnover in this equilibrium are consistent with the...
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During an infectious-disease epidemic, people make choices that impact transmission, trading off the risk of infection with the social-economic benefits of activity. In this paper, we investigate how the qualitative features of an epidemic's Nash-equilibrium trajectory depend on the nature of...
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We analyze some of the perverse incentives that may arise under the current Medicare prescription drug benefit design. In particular, risk adjustment for a stand-alone prescription drug benefit creates perverse incentives for prescription drug plans' coverage decisions and/or pharmaceutical...
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