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Two values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
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Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
van den Brink, René - 2011
this game the dividend of any coalition that is neither a subset of a union nor a union of unions is zero. The partition … dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero. We apply the values to an economic example in which the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118315
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The V L Value for Network Games
Hendrickx, Ruud; Borm, Peter; van den Brink, René; … - 2005
In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games. This value turns out to have a nice interpretation. We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064942
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Redistribution of tax resources : a cooperative game theory approach
Calvo, Emilio - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 4, pp. 633-686
the tax game. This game estimates the fiscal resources collected in each region, or coalition of regions, by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012694354
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An owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures
Brink, René van den; Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, … - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190658
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The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games
Pham Do, Kim Hang; Norde, Henk - 2011
Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199078
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Shapley's Value and Its Axiomatization in Games with Prior Probabilities of Coalition Formation
Kamionko, Vladimir; Marakulin, Valeriy M. - 2020
are used: relations between the players and the probability of coalition formation. We suggest and study the sufficient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014102140
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The Bonacich Shapley centrality
Allouch, Nizar; Meca, Ana; Polotskaya, K. - 2021
consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584076
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Shapley Compensation Scheme
Dehez, Pierre - 2008
We study a particular class of cost sharing games - quot;data gamesquot; - covering situations where some players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. The problem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive but generally not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012725447
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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how … of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask … strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012550309