, discuss the difficulties with dynamic voting procedures and review some ways to overcome them. We conclude by highlighting the …

distribution with independent marginals then, under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not optimal. If the marginals … are identical (but not necessarily independent), then voting first on the total sum and next on the differences is often … welfare superior to voting on the original issues. We also provide various lower bounds on incentive efficiency: in particular …

We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committee's efficiency, and (ii) the … important consequences: it 'pays' to be allowed to vote, as voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting …

We propose a two-period model of a committee with sequentially voting members, who may differ in their degree of … efficiency. In this model we examine whether the publication of the committee's voting records is desirable. We show that first …-period welfare is higher if voting records remain secret because transparency induces less efficient committee members to vote in a …