In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

This paper considers an investment timing problem in a duopoly framework. The results of the seminal contribution by Fudenberg en Tirole (1985, RES) are extended by introduction of uncertainty. Three scenarios are identified. In the first scenario we have a preemption equilibrium with dispersed...

This paper studies timing games in continuous time where payoffs are stochastic and strongly Markovian. The main interest is in characterizing equilibria where players preempt each other along almost every sample path. It is found that the existence of such preemption equilibria depends...

In this paper we analyse a dynamic model of investment under uncertainty in a duopoly, in which each firm has an option to switch from the present market to a new market. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies and show that both preemption and attrition can occur along...