We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense …

(overlapping climate clubs) to reduce CO2 emissions. R&D provision in clubs produces two types of positive externalities: a global … multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands. …

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense …

This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is … determined by the sum of productivities if the coalition exceeds a minimal threshold of members. We consider competitive … societies in which the surplus of a coalition is split according to productivity and egalitarian societies in which coalitions …

sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition …We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with … externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the …

been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 … member state threatens to leave the Union. By using cheap talk a member state may increase the credibility of its outside …

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … a player within that coalition is induced by the social structure and is measured by a power function. We call a payoff …