We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action...

We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example, because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic and might want to influence the action...

We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action...

We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action...

In an economy with indivisible goods, a continuum of agents and quasilinear utility, we show that equilibrium exists regardless of the nature of agents' preferences over bundles. This contrasts with results for economies with a finite number of agents, which require restrictions on preferences...

In matching markets, the existence of stable matchings can only be guaranteed under substantive restrictions on preferences. We investigate how these results change in large markets, which we model with a continuum of agents of each type, following the work of Aumann (1964) on general...

Large and thus statistically powerful A/B tests are increasingly popular in business and policy to evaluate potential innovations. We study how to optimally use scarce experimental resources to screen innovations. To do so, we propose a new framework for optimal experimentation that we call the...

The endowment effect, the tendency to value possessions more than non-possessions, is a well known departure from rational choice and has been replicated in numerous settings. We investigate the universality of the endowment effect, its evolutionary significance, and its dependence on...

Adverse selection is an important problem in many markets. Governments respond to it with complex regulations: mandates, community rating, subsidies, risk adjustment, and regulation of contract characteristics. This paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection....

This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous preferences. The model departs from the standard Gale and Shapley (1962) model by assuming that a finite number of agents on one side (colleges or firms) are matched to a continuum mass of agents on the other...