We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on … expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors …. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price …

available for borrowing, mutual funds acquire information about short selling, which they exploit for trading. Funds with … lower lending fees than passive funds, consistent with funds paying for the information with lower fees …