When bidders are not substitutes, we show that there is no standard ascend-ing auction that implements a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium under truthful bidding. Such an impossibility holds also in environments where the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff and is thus...

In the symmetric independent private value model, we revisit auctions with entry by adding two additional ingredients: difficulties to commit to the announced mechanism, in particular not to update the reserve price after bidders took their entry decisions, and seller's ex ante uncertainty on...

Brendstrup (2007) and Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006) claim that sequential English auction models with multi-unit demand can be identified from the distribution of the last stage winning price and without any assumption on bidding behavior in the earliest stages. We show that their identification...

We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities are not observed by the econometrician. First, we adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and we explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility to identify private value auction models....

We introduce contingent auction mechanisms, which is a superset of combinatorial auctions, and where bidders submit bids on packages that are contingent on the whole final assignment. Without externalities, the Vickrey and the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction are both robust if items are perceived...

Le recrutement constitue un enjeu majeur dans toutes les organisations. Pour être certaines de ne pas commettre d'erreur dans leurs recrutements, les entreprises font appel à toutes sortes de tests et particulièrement des tests de personnalité. En effet, l'intégration d'un nouveau salarié...