We consider a duopoly market in which two retailers with different reputation compete in prices and one of the retailers is considering selling through a new channel. Consumers are reputation sensitive and averse to the new channel. In addition, the reputation sensitivity and new channel...

This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternatingoffers, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the...

We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually...

We study a long-term relationship between a risk-neutral firm that has been delegated to manage a local utility project and a regulator that has always the option-to-revoke the delegation. We show that when the threat of revocation is credible and the cost of exercising it is not too high, the...

We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further...

This paper studies how the persistence of past choices can be used to create incentives in a continuous time stochastic game. A large player, such as a firm, interacts with a sequence of small players, such as customers. The large player faces moral hazard and her actions are imperfectly...

We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium,...

We model the dynamic contest between two players as a game of tug-of-war with a Tullock contest success function (CSF). We show that (pure strategy) Markov perfect equilibrium of this game exists, and it is unique. In this equilibrium - in stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all pay...

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

We analyze novel portfolio liquidation games with self-exciting order flow. Both the N-player game and the mean-field game are considered. We assume that players' trading activities have an impact on the dynamics of future market order arrivals thereby generating an additional transient price...