Using CEO severance contracts during 1992-2010, we find that CEOs with a severance contract tend to reduce corporate investments, impede innovation, and decrease firm risk across several dimensions, leading to shareholder value destruction. This negative value effect is stronger during the...

Firms enjoy wide discretion in their disclosure of patent-related events, which investors generally view as "good news" announcements. This study examines patent disclosure behavior before earnings announcements in light of managers incentives to avoid the stock price-related consequences of...

ABSTRACTChapter I Does Corporate Governance Make a Difference in Hard Times?Using data from proxy statements, I investigate the impact of various firm characteristics and corporate governance measures on firm performance during a period of an exogenous economic shock. The first sample...

This thesis empirically studies the determinants of CEO employment contracts and the impacts of such agreements on managerial investment decisions. As of 2005, approximately half of S&P 500 CEOs had employment contracts. A typical contract protects the CEO by decreasing the probability he will...