This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent's hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prudent and able, the principal induces a higher...

This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent’s hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prudent and able, the principal induces a higher...

In a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction with risk-averse suppliers, we determine the conditions under which the buyer has an incentive to grant a supplier a right of first refusal. We show that this clause can lower the buyer’s expected cost when suppliers (the incumbent and new...

Allotment and subcontracting are the two alternative mechanisms enabling the participation of SMEs in procurement. We compare these two alternatives in the context of a procurement contract awarded by a first-price sealed-bid auction. When the winning large firm is constrained with respect to...

Under a specific informational framework, we compare the seller's expected revenue from a first-price auction and a second-price auction when bidders are risk averse and have private affiliated values.

Subcontracting is a widespread use in procurement contracting. However, subcontracting regulation differs between countries. In the USA e.g., each bidder is required to submit the potential subcontracting plan before the award of contracts when they exceed $500,000 ($1,000,000 for construction)....

In this paper, we use the Rank-Dependent Expected-Utility (RDEU) model to analyse the preventive behaviour of an individual faced with the risk of being sick. The RDEU model makes it possible to take into account the way economic agents perceive the risk of being sick in the future. We first...