In a preemption game, players decide when to take an irreversible action. Delaying the action exogenously increases payoffs, but there is an early mover advantage. Riordan (1992) shows that in a preemption game with two asymmetric players, players act in decreasing order of efficiency. This...

We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A finite number of firms decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon investment, a firm receives flow profits which decrease in the number of firms that have invested. The cost of investment declines over...

We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A finite number of firms decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon investment, a firm receives flow profits which decrease in the number of firms that have invested. The cost of investment declines over...

This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A...

This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A...

This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...