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A choice problem is risky (respectively ambiguous) if the decision maker is choosing between probability distributions (respectively sets of probability distributions) over utility relevant consequences. We provide an axiomatic foundation for and a representation of continuous linear preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098616
A choice problem is risky (respectively ambiguous) if the decision maker is choosing between probability distributions (respectively sets of probability distributions) over utility relevant consequences. We provide an axiomatic foundation for and a representation of continuous linear preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319977
From Breiman et al. [...] are singleton sets, this is the Blackwell and Dubins [2] version of Skorohod's representation theorem.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319981
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748621
A choice problem is risky (respectively ambiguous) if the decision maker is choosing between probability distributions (respectively sets of probability distributions) over utility relevant consequences. We provide an axiomatic foundation for and a representation of continuous linear preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748628
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467278
A multiple-prior decision maker is open-minded if she can describe, as subjective uncertainty, all convex sets of distributions over payoff relevant consequences. Theorem 1: open-mindedness is equivalent to the ability to subjectively describe both the uniform distribution on an interval and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840828
This paper considers dynamic moral hazard settings, in which the consequences of the agent's actions is not precisely understood. In a new continuous-time principal-agent model with drift ambiguity, the agent's unobservable action translates to drift set for the diffusion processes that describe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013313165
We propose a model of political persuasion in which a biased newspaper aims to convince voters to vote for the government. Each voter receives the newspaper's report, as well as an independent private signal. Voters then exchange this information on social media and form posterior beliefs,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846061
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014429204