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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722963
Hamiache (2001) assigns to every TU game a so-called associated game and then shows that the Shapley value is characterized as the unique solution for TU games satisfying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. The latter notion means that for every game the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326456
Given any alpha in [0,1], an alpha-constant-sum game on a finite set of players, N, is a function that assigns a real number to any coalition S (being a subset of the player set N), such that the sum of the worth of the coalition S and the worth of its complementary coalition N\S is alpha times...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012114775
In view of the nature of pursuing profit, a selfish coefficient function is employed to describe the degrees of selfishness of players in different coalitions, which is the desired rate of return to the worth of coalitions. This function brings in the concept of individual expected reward to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819517
Purpose: the aim of this paper is to investigate the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) network equilibrium wiht the consideration of three practical factors: two complementary types of suppliers, risk-averse character of the manufacturer and capacity constraints of the suppliers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011939212
Abstract Doubly robust (DR) estimators are an important class of statistics derived from a theory of semiparametric efficiency. They have become a popular tool in causal inference, including applications to dynamic treatment regimes. The doubly robust estimators for the mean response to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014610903
This work deals with the weighted excesses of players in cooperative games which are obtained by summing up all the weighted excesses of all coalitions to which they belong. We first show that lexicographically minimizing the individual weighted excesses of players gives the same minimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012233995
Hamiache (2001) assigns to every TU game a so-called associated game and then shows that the Shapley value is characterized as the unique solution for TU games satisfying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. The latter notion means that for every game the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099629
Given any alpha in [0,1], an alpha-constant-sum game on a finite set of players, N, is a function that assigns a real number to any coalition S (being a subset of the player set N), such that the sum of the worth of the coalition S and the worth of its complementary coalition N\S is alpha times...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890604
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805956