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A Continuous Dilemma ∗
Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan - Economics Department, University of California-Santa … - 2009
We study prisoner’s dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011130581
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The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment
Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - 2006
This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346451
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Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation
Oliveira, André L.; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-16
Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by … the anticipated backlash from retaliation, which targets coalition members only. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171770
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Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence
Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1987
This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249153
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Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game
Drouvelis, Michalis; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Shimada, Natsumi; … - 2023
Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i … destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders can destroy the proposer's endowment. Although these added options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014331767
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How moral codes evolve in a trust game
Rabanal, Jean Paul; Friedman, Daniel - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 150-160
This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316645
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Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information
Metzger, Lars Peter - 2011
Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748253
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Conjectural variations in aggregative games : an evolutionary perspective
Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009663477
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Evolutionary determinants of war
Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2013
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198498
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Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests
Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2016
In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504952