We consider a model where multiple principals repeatedly offer short-term contracts to three or more agents with private information. Under low discounting there exists a simple class of mechanisms that sustains all equilibrium allocations that could be generated by arbitrarily complex...

This paper studies implicit pricing of non-wage job characteristics in the labour market using a two-sided matching model. It departs from the previous literature by allowing worker heterogeneity in productivity, which gives rise to a double transaction problem in a hedonic model. Deriving...

This paper develops a model in which competing governments offer financial incentives to individual firms to induce the firms to locate within their jurisdictions. Equilibrium is described under three specifications of the supplementary taxes. There is no misallocation of capital under two of...

We develop a model of the labor market where firms incur an adjustment cost when one of their workers quits, and males and females form households assortatively by skill. We show how this environment can lead to an economy where females earn less and drop out more frequently than equally skilled...

This paper studies the bilateral contracting environment where multiple principals negotiate contracts with multiple agents independently. It is shown that equilibrium allocations associated with (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of negotiation schemes can be...

This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract...

If the agent's preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single...

This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place through simple non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection when multiple buyers (e.g., entrepreneurs with risky projects) non-exclusively contract with multiple firms (e.g., banks). It shows that any price schedule can be supported...