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Relational Contracts and Specific Training
Malcomson, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2014
productive, or near equally productive employees without relational contracts.  Investment in specific training relaxes the … incentive constraints on relational contracts, so the optimal level of investment can be higher for those with a relational … additional cost of optimal investment precisely offsets the post-investment surplus for marginal employees in relational …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071727
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Relational contracts and specific training
Malcomson, James M. - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442455
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Debt, Investment, and Growth in Developing Countries with Segmented Labor Markets
Buffie, Edward F. - 2020
We introduce a new suite of macroeconomic models that extend and complement the Debt, Investment, and Growth (DIG …'s properties by analyzing the growth, debt, and distributional consequences of big-push public investment programs with different … mixes of investment in human capital and infrastructure. We show that investment in human capital is much more effective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828060
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Debt, investment, and growth in developing countries with segmented labor markets
Buffie, Edward F.; Zanna, Luis-Felipe; Adam, Christopher S. - 2020
We introduce a new suite of macroeconomic models that extend and complement the Debt, Investment, and Growth (DIG …'s properties by analyzing the growth, debt, and distributional consequences of big-push public investment programs with different … mixes of investment in human capital and infrastructure. We show that investment in human capital is much more effective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012252029
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Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information
Malcomson, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with a continuum of privately observedagent types that are persistent over time. For a sufficiently productive relationship,a pooling contract exists in which all agent types continuing the relationshipchoose the same action. Necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701819
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Relational Incentive Contracts with Private Information
Malcomson, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012
This paper extends the relational contract model in Levin (2003) with shocks to theagent’s cost of effort (agent’s type) to shocks to the principal’s valuation of the agent’seffort (principal’s type). When optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133036
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Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information
Malcomson, James - 2015
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307127
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Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
Malcomson, James M. - 2015 - This version: July 24, 2015
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994
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Human Capital and Competition: Strategic Complementarities in Firm-based Training
Stevens, Margaret - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012
Vocational training systems differ markedly between countries. A model of firm-based human capital investment predicts … general and specific investment may occur, but turnover is low and wage profiles are relatively flat. Multiple equilibria are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004405
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Do Dominant Firms Provide More Training?
Bilanakos, Christos; Green, Colin P.; Heywood, John S.; … - University of Cyprus Department of Economics - 2014
This paper examines the relationship between firm-specific training and product market competition. A canonical Cournot competition model shows that the profitability of training investments increases as the number of competitors decreases. Empirical evidence from British establishments in 1998,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010901489