We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...

We study a multidivisional firm where headquarters are exposed to moral hazard by division managers under uncertainty (or "ambiguity") aversion. We show the aggregation and linearity results of Holmström and Milgrom (1987) hold in an environment with IID ambiguity, as in Chen and Epstein...

We develop a theory of innovation waves, investor sentiment, and merger activity based on Knightian uncertainty. Uncertainty-averse investors are more optimistic on an innovation when they can make contemporaneous investments in multiple uncertain projects. Innovation waves occur when there is a...

We propose a new theory of systemic risk based on Knightian uncertainty (or "ambiguity"). We show that, due to uncertainty aversion, beliefs on future asset returns are endogenous, and bad news on one asset class induces investors to be more pessimistic about other asset classes as well. This...

We explore the effects that optimism bias has on the demand for insurance. Our theory is based on a simple binomial model of the demand for insurance in which consumers make optimistically biased assessments concerning the likelihood of future outcomes. From this model, we derive an insurance...

We explore demand for insurance in a setting where nonparticipation has been com-mon: health insurance. We present a stylized model of insurance demand in which consumers make optimistically-biased assessments about future health outcomes. The standard model would predict participation unless...

We argue the earnings announcement premium is a measure of firm-specific uncertainty aversion. Our stylized model shows earnings announcements, as pure news events, are priced only if investors are uncertainty averse; further, the earnings announcement return is negatively correlated to future...

This paper establishes a role for corporate governance regulation. An externality operating through executive compensation motivates regulation. Governance lowers agency costs, allowing firms to grant less incentive pay. When a firm increases governance and lowers incentive pay, other firms can...

Excess credits and tax-credit carryforwards affect corporations' investment in foreign subsidiaries. This study examines import and export neutrality, excess foreign tax credits created by TRA '86, and the tax consequences of dividend remittances.

We consider the transitions among intragenerational and alternative intergenerational financing and liquidity risk-sharing mechanisms, in an Overlapping Generations model with endogenous levels of long-lived investments. The existence and characterization of a Self-Sustaining Mechanism, stable...