We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear...

We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear...

A local public goods game in weighted and directed networks is analyzed. Individual efforts are imperfect substitutes, players' preferences are heterogeneous and local externalities are non-uniform and asymmetric. Sufficient conditions under which the game admits a unique equilibrium are...

This paper investigates the social optimum in network games of strategic substitutes and identifies how network structure shapes optimal policies. First, we show that the socially optimal profile is ob-tained through a combination of two opposite network effects, generated by the incoming and...

We model agents in a network game of strategic complements and negative externalities. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and of a unique social optimum are established. Under these conditions, we find that players with more vulnerable locations in the network...

This paper studies the problem of non-cooperative water allocation between heterogeneous communities embodied in an acyclic network of water sources. The extraction activity of a community has a negative impact on the extraction activity of its direct successors: it reduces the intensity of...

A directed network game of imperfect strategic substitutes with heterogeneous players is analyzed. We consider concave additive separable utility functions that encompass the quasi-linear ones. It is found that pure strategy Nash equilibria verify a non-linear complementarity problem. By...

Since von Neuman and Morgenstern's (1944) contribution to game theory, a rational decision maker will rank risky prospects according to the celebrated Expected utility criterion. This method takes lotteries i.e. (simple) probability distributions to represent risky prospects. If the decision...

Since von Neuman and Morgenstern's (1944) contribution to game theory, the expected utility criterion has become the standard functional to evaluate risky prospects. Risky prospects are understood to be lotteries on a set of prizes. In which case a decision maker will receive a precise prize...

We prove for totally monotone games defined on the set of Borel sets of a locally compact s-compact topological space a similar decomposition theorem to the famous Yosida-Hewitt's one for finitely additive measures. This way any totally monotone decomposes into a continuous part and a...