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Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants : a mechanism design approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2015

investigates this specific tradeoff and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332808

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2014

investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208691

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; LARS-GUNNAR, Svensson - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014

paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium … restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186230

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894988

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2015

rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant … he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting …. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208721

Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2020

. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208891

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012667954

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015206919

House Allocation with Overlapping Agents: A DynamicMechanism Design Approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173

Efficient lottery design

Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Nesterov, Alexander - 2015

There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478795