In this research, we employ artificial neural networks in conjunction with selected economic and financial variables to forecast recessions in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and USA. We model the relationship between selected economic and financial (indicator) variables and...

This paper investigates the bargaining between owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts, in order to explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes. We consider the managerial incentive contracts based on the profit and sales of...

We again examine how the managers' bargaining power affects social welfare and the firms'' profits in both quantity and price competition, in particular, in the case where each firm''s production technology is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that under both the competition...

This paper examines the endogenous choice between democracy and conflict in a scenario with different social classes in terms of income inequality and with parties representing each of the two social classes. We consider how the change in economic inequality between the poor and rich people...

We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the...

This paper incorporates the vertical structure of governments into a mixed oligopoly model by considering the public firms owned by different government levels, namely, a state‐owned public firm and a local public firm. As in the existing literature, a state‐owned public firm is assumed to...

This paper considers a differentiated goods managerial mixed duopoly composed of one social welfare‐maximising public firm and one profit‐maximising private firm. We model the firm choice of the strategic contract. We find that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently strong, the...

This paper studies capacity choice in a mixed duopoly with differentiated goods under quantity competition and price competition, taking into account the separation between ownership and management. In this paper, we show that in equilibrium, under quantity competition, both the public firm and...

This paper investigates the bargaining between owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts, in order to explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes. We consider the managerial incentive contracts based on the profit and sales of...

We again examine how the managers' bargaining power affects social welfare and the firms'' profits in both quantity and price competition, in particular, in the case where each firm''s production technology is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that under both the competition...