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In the long-run we are all dead : on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - 2012
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489806
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In the long-run we are all dead : on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments ; conference paper
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - 2013
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i) there is a sufficiently long time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343787
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In the long-run we are all dead: On the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim - 2012
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833242
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Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles N.; Wilkening, Tom - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2011
A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917760
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Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Engelmann, Dirk - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
Punishing free riders might promote cooperation, but it can also lead to feuds. We use a public good game with … punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to … feuds. While the possibility of a feud a¤ects punishment and contribution patterns, total earnings are not signi?cantly di …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574884
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Cooperation and punishment under uncertain enforcement
Sousa, Sergio - 2010
This paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277489
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Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments
Nikiforakis, Nikos - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with infor- mation about the earnings of their peers leads to lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458710
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Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, Nikos - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2004
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitoring and sanctioning between members of a group. However, often we can not allow for punishment and exclude the possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051667
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Incentives for Cooperation in Teams: Sociality Meets Decision Rights
Butz, Britta; Guillén, Pablo; Harbring, Christine - 2021
We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012597388
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Incentives for cooperation in teams: sociality meets decision rights
Butz, Britta; Guillén, Pablo; Harbring, Christine - 2021
We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494092