Similar Search Results

Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

Katsikas, Stamatios; Kolokoltsov, Vassili; Yang, Wei - In: Games 7 (2016) 4, pp. 1-25

We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550602

Strategies of survival in dynamic asset market games

Amir, Rabah; Evstigneev, Igor V.; Xu, Le - 2008

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of a financial market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and partially reinvested. The traders use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003966195

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2017

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764914

Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay

Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657634

Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay

Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2009

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009735339

Behavioral equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics in asset markets

Evstigneev, Igor V.; Hens, Thorsten; Potapova, Valeriya; … - 2020

This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game theory. Its key characteristic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012219095

Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics

Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 165-192

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy pro les, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy pro le, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687048

Imitation dynamics with spatial poisson-distributed review and mutation rates

Desierto, Desiree - 2012 - Version: January 2012

greater the probability of mutation into, and selection of, that preferred strategy. -- evolutionary games ; learning dynamics …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490661

Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games : theory and experiment in continuous time

Benndorf, Volker; Martinez-Martinez, Ismael; Normann, … - 2016

Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter k. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011487939

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last