strategies, showing that the cutoff signals implement all implementable state-independent distributions of students across …

colleges to strategically target their admissions, forgoing students sought after by others and seeking students overlooked by … others. When students' types are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weights on less … the resulting assignments of decentralized matching are inefficient and unfair. A centralized matching via Gale and …

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether … they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the …

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some …

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …

college admission. The results show that the matching efficiency increased in course of the decentralization. This increase is …Applying a differences-in-differences strategy, I study the decentralization of university admission as a natural … experiment. Is the centralized or decentralized procedure better suited to match prospective students to universities? The …

This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride … algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less frequently and matching agents more assortatively …