This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The...

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she can privately purchase any signal about her valuation. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. The cost of a signal is smooth and increasing in informativeness. We...

This paper considers a two-sided dynamic matching market where agents arrive at the market randomly. An arriving agent is immediately matched if there are agents waiting on the other side. Otherwise, the arriving agent has to decide whether to leave the market and take her outside option or to...

This paper considers a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedly matched with one another and decide whether to enter into profitable partnerships. Each agent has a physical colour and a social colour. The social colour of an agent acts as a signal about the physical colour of agents in his...

This paper considers a moral hazard model with (i) a risk-neutral agent and (ii) agent limited liability. Prior to interacting with the principal, the agent designs the production technology, which is a specification of the agent's cost of generating each output distribution with support...

This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of the other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions...