procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness-to-pay-willingness-to-accept disparity. In a laboratory … experiment, we compare four different second-price auction formats for procuring a good. The four formats are a sealed …-bid auction and three di erent descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness …

compared to an optimal common reserve price. Implications for auction design are considered. …

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of … ratio offered is selected as the winner of the auction. We model the decision process as based on a general noisy ranking of …

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of … ratio offered is selected as the winner of the auction. We model the decision process as based on a general noisy ranking of …

In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more … encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition …

Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient … allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex … post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the …

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and … Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation under the constraint that sellers are protected by …

mirrors real construction procurement auctions, our laboratory experiment tests the impact of the precision of a bidder’s cost …As procurement auctions increasingly move to digital platforms, more data and information is available (or can be made … estimate and the degree to which bidders know the inherent cost estimate precisions in the auction. We find that more …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …