In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self-enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60% of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly...

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private domestic or foreign firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp...

In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self-enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60 % of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly...

Two insurance companies I 1 ,I 2 with reserves R 1 (t),R 2 (t) compete for customers, such that in a suitable differential game the smaller company I 2 with R 2 (0)<R 1 (0) aims at minimizing R 1 (t)−R 2 (t) by using the premium p 2 as control and the larger I 1 at maximizing by using p 1. Deductibles K 1 ,K 2 are fixed but may be different. If K 1 >K 2 and I 2 is the leader choosing its premium first, conditions for Stackelberg equilibrium are established. For gamma-distributed...</r>

This paper investigates how the heterogenous incomes and preferences of potential donors affect the timing of contribution decisions when it is endogenously determined by contributors themselves. More specifically, we use a simple setting with two donors, Cobb-Douglas preferences, and complete...

Utility and users are two important subjects in power dispatching, and each participant wants to maximize its benefits. That is to say, utility and users are engaged in an interest game with each other. In this paper, a day-ahead economic dispatch strategy which can solve mixed integer...

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...