This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the relation between the performance and governance structure of open-end, domestic-equity mutual funds during the 1985 to 2002 period. We show that experienced large-fund portfolio managers outperform their size, book-to-market, and momentum...

We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards...

We study fund-firm connections that arise when firm executives and directors serve as fund directors. We find that connected funds are significantly more likely to vote with management in proposals with negative ISS recommendations or low shareholder support. As our data shows that management...

We examine whether boards are sufficiently well-informed to make efficient decisions on CEO compensation. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decision on CEO compensation, we use mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent...

This article explains what independent fund directors should know about fund litigation. While independent directors were named defendants in prior lawsuits – for example, § 36(b) excessive fee lawsuits – the scope of litigation that followed 2003 was without precedent both in terms of the...

The recent surge in the use of team-managed funds in the mutual fund industry suggests that the benefits of team management might outweigh its costs. However, extant empirical evidence is not consistent with the view that team managed funds generate superior returns relative to individual...

Recent literature emphasizes the importance of a director's external network of social connections. I use a sample of closed-end funds to show that internal, within-board connections are also significant determinants of shareholder value. I find that boards with shared education, employment, and...

To protect fund investors against conflicting interests with fund management companies, U.S. funds have mandatory independent directors. That is not the case for funds in Europe, set-up in accordance with the UCITS Directive. Nevertheless, many UCITS funds have voluntarily appointed independent...

Previous literature disagrees on the impact of board independence on firm value. The disagreement generally stems from the endogenous nature of board appointments. I add new evidence to this discussion by using a sample of closed-end funds to document the value-enhancing effects of independent...

This article explains what independent fund directors should know about fund litigation. While independent directors were named defendants in prior lawsuits - for example, § 36(b) excessive fee lawsuits - the scope of litigation that followed 2003 was without precedent both in terms of the...