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We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test … the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … robustness of stability between the rounds of experiments. Our findings provide substantial support for the rising practice of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574107
observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011800605
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching … for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499578
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503462
existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703024
I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011754942
We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711
We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053
We construct a dynamic model of two-sided sorting in labor markets with multi-dimensional agent and firm heterogeneity. We apply it to study optimal party structure and the decision of how (de)centralized candidate recruitment should be. Parties are non-unitary actors and compete at the local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014229853