We propose a two-period model of a committee with sequentially voting members, who may differ in their degree of … efficiency. In this model we examine whether the publication of the committee's voting records is desirable. We show that first …-period welfare is higher if voting records remain secret because transparency induces less efficient committee members to vote in a …

distribution with independent marginals then, under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not optimal. If the marginals … are identical (but not necessarily independent), then voting first on the total sum and next on the differences is often … welfare superior to voting on the original issues. We also provide various lower bounds on incentive efficiency: in particular …

In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote … jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a unanimity rule than under majority rule. Dekel and Piccione (2000) show … that those unintuitive predictions also hold with sequential voting. In this paper, we report paired experiments with …

We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their …

We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committee's efficiency, and (ii) the … important consequences: it 'pays' to be allowed to vote, as voting committee members earn significantly more than non-voting …

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such … situations, majority voting can have a "dark side", that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by … a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy …

Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core …, voting behavior and outcomes would be determined predominately by social and psychological forces, would thereby exhibit few … that require a different research agenda to bring into focus. Some of our analysis also has implications for voting …