This paper analyzes the long-run dynamics of internal conflict, elite action over privately- versus publicly-provided security, and state development outcomes in China. We construct new county-level data that span nearly one millennium. We find that, traditionally, elites turned away from clans...

Whether a political system can attract high-quality candidates is key to producing high-quality politicians. In this article, we examine the issue of candidate pool formation in developing countries where elections are absent. We argue that a government can attract competent individuals to...

Ever since the Federalist Papers, there has been a common view that the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture by vested interests. Relying on the analytical framework of relative capture, I challenge this view by arguing that interest groups have different...

When do autocrats build clean courts? This paper seeks to address this question in a Chinese context. I argue that foreign investors who hold mobile assets and have a strong preference for a fair legal system are major players in pushing Chinese local governments to build clean courts. Chinese...

I propose an agricultural theory of economic transformation that rice cultivation is conducive to market reform. Using sub-national data from China, I show that market reform is more successful in rice than in wheat regions after controlling for income, policy, geography, and interest groups,...

Authoritarian leaders around the world often fight against corruption in an effort to win public support. Conventional wisdom holds that this strategy works because leaders can signal their benevolent intentions by removing corrupt officials. We argue that fighting against corruption can...

We analyze the conditions under which a country’s social structure facilitates or impedes the state’s mobilization of financial resources during civil conflict. Our argument emphasizes the ways in which the central state can divide and conquer social groups in order to empower the state....

Existing theories of state strengthening focus on macro-level factors. We know less about the micro-level incentives for elites to support or oppose state strengthening. I develop an argument in which elites choose between the state and private order institutions (e.g., clans, tribes, or ethnic...

We analyze the conditions under which internal conflict can promote or impede state development, taking imperial China as a laboratory. We develop a novel theoretical framework in which local elites and the central state interact over the provision of internal security. Using new micro-level...

Is the traditional logic by which violent conflict fosters long-run political development universal? To help address this puzzle, this article compares Europe with China. While historical warfare was very common across both units, representative government only flourished in Europe. We suggest...