model using the life insurance holding information from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data. Counterfactual … of such i.i.d. shocks gets smaller, and more of their lapsations are driven either by income, health or bequest motive … shocks. Income and health shocks are relatively more important than bequest motive shocks in explaining lapsations when …

model using the life insurance holding information from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data. Counterfactual … of such i.i.d. shocks gets smaller, and more of their lapsations are driven either by income, health or bequest motive … shocks. Income and health shocks are relatively more important than bequest motive shocks in explaining lapsations when …

model using the life insurance holding information from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data. Counterfactual … of such i.i.d. shocks gets smaller, and more of their lapsations are driven either by income, health or bequest motive … shocks. Income and health shocks are relatively more important than bequest motive shocks in explaining lapsations when …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …