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Pruzhansky, Vitaly - 2003

We characterize strategy sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb) in extensive games of perfect information and finite horizon. It is shown that any such game possesses only one minimal curb set, which necessarily includes all its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Applications of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334337

Non-cooperative games

Damme, Eric E. C. van - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285514

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

Renou, Ludovic; Schlag, Karl H. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008663226

A discussion of maximin

Pruzhansky, Vitaly - 2004

This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334836

Rationality

Denis, Andy - 2017

rational economic agent, a Homo economicus. Equally, the notion of rationality has been the focus of criticism from those … the neoclassical rational individual agent, in particular showing the supersession of the older conception of rationality … as maximisation by the newer version of rationality as consistency. In the older presentation of the matter, the agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971674

Rationality, Strategic Uncertainty and Belief Diversity in Non-Cooperative Games

Zambrano, Eduardo - 2015

I investigate the existence of epistemic models for complete information games that satisfy the following properties: (R) players do not rule out their opponents use rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices, (K) they do not rule out, ex ante, that they can come to know the action...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707988