In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms...

"In this paper we present and solve a three-stage game of entry, location, and pricing in a spatial price discrimination framework with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms. We provide a unique characterization of all pure undominated strategy SPNE without imposing restrictions on the...

When firms set prices and face entry costs, efficiency in production and in entry are not simultaneously achieved, generating the possibility that regulatory interventions can lead to efficiency enhancements. We show through the Bertrand model that in markets with public entry and regular...

In this paper three issues are pursued. First, a model of capacity constrained price competition is suggested. The basic feature of this model is that a pure strategy equilibrium exists for all price subgames. Second, this permits Cournot outcomes in heterogeneous markets to be interpreted as...

This paper analyses an open economy Ramsey model with an endogenous labour supply without capital. The technology defines an optimal firm size. Changes to the number of firms is subject to adjustment costs, so that the entry dynamics is determined endogenously. We find that there is a short run...