This is the first draft of a chapter in a planned book on the Prisoner's Dilemma, edited by Martin Peterson, to be published by Cambridge University Press. It discusses the nature of the conditionals involved in deliberation, taking the Prisoner's Dilemma game as point of departure. --...

In [5] (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed notion is the...

We consider decision problems under complete ignorance and extend the minimax regret principle to situations where, after taking an action, the decision maker does not necessarily learn the state of the world. For example, if the decision maker only learns what the outcome is, then all she knows...

We argue in favor of a departure from the standard equilibrium approach in game theory in favor of the less ambitious goal of describing only the actual behavior of rational players. We investigate the notion of rationality in behavioral models of extensive-form games (allowing for imperfect...

We investigate the extension of backward-induction to von Neumann extensive games (where information sets have a synchronous structure) and provide an epistemic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward-induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2013), who also...

We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator (corresponding - semantically - to a binary Kripke relation), while the latter is merely a classical operator (corresponding -...

In an earlier paper [Rational choice andAGMbelief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a correspondence was established between the choice structures of revealed-preference theory (developed in economics) and the syntactic belief revision functions of the AGM theory (developed in philosophy...

In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is a strict refinement of PBE. In (Bonanno,...

We argue in favor of a departure from the equilibrium approach in game theory towards the less ambitious goal of describing only the actual behavior of rational players. The notions of Nash equilibrium and its refinements require a specification of the players' choices and beliefs not only along...