We study strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players. Our theoretical model of a round-robin rank-order tournament predicts that players conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in the subsequent contest if the degree of heterogeneity in the...

When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these...

We study strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players. Our theoretical model of a round-robin rank-order tournament predicts that players conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in the subsequent contest if the degree of heterogeneity in the...

We investigate whether the gender of judges as well as the gender composition of juries affect individual performance evaluations using information on single diving competitions at three World Championships. Our results indicate that gender per se does not affect individual opinions, while...

We analyse gender differences in the response to social pressure. Our setting provides information on decision making by both female and male referees towards rewarding extra time in football. The exact score at the time of the decision allows us to evaluate how much it favours the home team and...

While there is no consensus concerning the legal and moral judgment towards prostitution, there is an overwhelming agreement on the need to fight sexual slavery. The paper shows the effect of clients' punishment in the market for commercial sex (the so called neo-abolitionism or nordic...

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...