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We construct an overlapping generations model in which agents live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own consumption and the human capital and environmental quality endowed to her offspring. Entering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903420
Taking as given that we are consuming too much and that overconsumption leads to environmental degradation, the present paper examines the regulator's choices between informative advertisement and consumption taxation. We model overconsumption by considering individuals that care about social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513995
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A great challenge facing future agricultural water policy is to explore the potential for transition from the current myopic competitive (common) exploitation of groundwater resources to a long-term efficient and sustainable allocation. A number of economic and/or command and control instruments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008934713
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The present paper examines, within a dynamic framework, the use of information provision as a policy instrument to supplement environmental taxation. We assume that at least a fraction of consumers do not posses the required information to make the optimal choices, and that their behavior at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810988
In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We provide an analytical treatment of the main model used in the literature and offer a formal solution of it (which has not been available so far), while we clarify some misconceptions that exist in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596106
The present paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries in a twostage emission game. In the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement, while in the second stage the quantity of emissions is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862948
This paper examines the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an economy with trade. We extent the basic model of the IEAs by letting countries choose emission taxes and import tariffs as their policy instruments in order to manage climate change and control trade. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862949