The standard Bayesian model implies that information can never have a negative value. We put this implication to the proof. Our paper provides the first test of the value (positive or negative) of information under uncertainty. We show that the "Bayesian implication" stands in conflict with the...

We propose and axiomatically characterize a representation of ambiguity sensitive preferences. The distinguishing feature of our axiomatization is that we do not require preferences to be event-wise separable over any domain of acts. Even without any such separability restrictions, we are able...

We re-visit the hypothesis that the visceral urge to overconsume is what drives overwork amongst many individuals. We begin by considering the consumption-leisure decisions of individuals faced with an intrapersonal conflict between long-term rational calculations and short-term visceral urges...

We propose and axiomatically characterize a representation of ambiguity sensitive preferences. The distinguishing feature of our axiomatization is that we do not require preferences to be event-wise separable over any domain of acts. Even without any such separability restrictions, we are able...

We propose and axiomatically characterize a representation of ambiguity sensitive preferences. The distinguishing feature of our axiomatization is that we do not require preferences to be event-wise separable over any domain of acts. Even without any such separability restrictions, we are able...

The standard Bayesian model implies that information can never have a negative value. We put this implication to the proof. Our paper provides the first test of the value (positive or negative) of information under uncertainty. We show that the "Bayesian implication" stands in conflict with the...

Extensive field and experimental evidence shows that reference points shape behavior. But, what shapes the reference point? Candidates put forward in the literature range from the status quo, to rational expectations and the narrow focus of dreaming or worrying about a single possible outcome....

This dissertation addresses a basic difficulty in accommodating other-regarding preferences within existing models of decision making. Decision makers with such preferences may violate the property of stochastic dominance that is shared by both expected utility and almost any model of...

This dissertation addresses a basic difficulty in accommodating other-regarding preferences within existing models of decision making. Decision makers with such preferences may violate the property of stochastic dominance that is shared by both expected utility and almost any model of...