We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by (1) the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and (2) the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is...

In this study we conduct a field experiment to examine how qualifying an income-decreasing accounting change in years of strong financial performance affects user assessments of strategic reporting, current financial performance, and financial performance over the next three years (future...

In this study we report the results of an experiment that examines how relatively sophisticated financial statement users interpret management stock option compensation disclosures under SFAS No. 123 and SFAS No. 123R. We predict and find that mandated income statement recognition, as required...

In this study we report the results of a laboratory experiment in which we examine whether the credibility of management's balance-sheet classification of hybrid securities as liabilities or equity is a joint function of (1) the level of classification discretion in the reporting environment,...

I/B/E/S is a common source of analyst earnings forecast data, and the reliability of these data is important for practice and academic research. Examining a common sample period, we compare annual earnings forecasts across two versions of the I/B/E/S detail file, one made available in 2009 and...

Research suggests that investors fail to fully process changes in return on assets due to their incomplete processing of changes in asset turnover. We propose that investors do not fully process changes in return on assets—stemming from changes in asset turnover—because of their (1) fixation...

Researchers, practitioners, and standard setters emphasize the importance of disaggregating financial statements into operating and financial activities. However, there is a lack of research demonstrating that this disaggregation improves forecasts of profitability. In this study, we consider...

The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to include a clawback or holdback clause in executive compensation contracts. Using an experiment, we examine how executives react to the enforcement of these clauses after a restatement. We find that executives generally reduced the riskiness of their financial...

We examine whether financial reporting quality improves after firms voluntarily adopt a compensation clawback provision. Clawback provisions allow companies to recoup excess incentive pay in the event of an accounting restatement, and are intended to ex ante deter managers from publishing...

We present 60 experienced credit analysts with financial information for two firms: one that mainly outsources production and one that does not. We find that analysts are better able to identify firm characteristics that make an outsourcer more creditworthy when those characteristics are...