We analyze the regulatory procurement of electricity infrastructure that can take the form of either a traditional core investment or non-traditional distributed energy resources (DERs). We identify conditions under which a regulated utility will engage in self-sabotage (i.e., intentionally...

We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but...

The paper discusses the practical possibilities of achieving increased downstream processing and the policies that are commonly used for this purpose. It reviews the reasons why forward vertical integration is not always an optimal choice for extractive industry companies. It finds little...

An integrated management system is introduced when a company wants to achieve conformity of multiple norms with the aim of reducing the amount of paperwork, the time needed for assessment and the costs in construction and system maintenance. As the number of individual management systems has...

We consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand — unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship — for either Cournot or Bertrand competition....

We study final product manufacturers' incentives to introduce new products into the market and how they are affected by a merger among them. We show that when manufacturers distribute their products through multi-product retailers, a manufacturers merger, although it leads to an increase in the...