In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation...

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a diØ culty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More-over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have...

This short survey discusses recent findings on the robustness of Nash equilibria of strategic games with many semianonymous players. It describes the notion of structural robustness and its general consequences, as well as implications to particular games, such as ones played on the web and...

How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payoÞs to its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves...